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This paper assesses the impact of gender and race on judicial decisions on the federal Court 
of Appeals, paying particular attention to the institutional nuances of decision-making on 
three-judge appellate panels within circuits.  Our central question is whether and how racial 
minority and women judges influence legal policy on issues thought to be of particular 
concern to women and minorities.  Proper analysis of this question requires investigating 
whether women and minority judges influence the decisions of other panel members.  We 
find that the norm of unanimity on panels grants women influence over outcomes even 
when they are outnumbered on a panel. 
  
  
1.  Introduction 
 
While the concept of representation is central to American political science, it is 
problematic when invoked in connection with the judiciary.  This is because the 
judiciary’s ostensible task of neutral adjudication is in conflict with the notion that judges 
are political actors who represent discrete groups.  Pitkin’s (1967) classic distinction 
between descriptive and substantive representation is useful for distinguishing two senses 
in which the judiciary could be thought to be representative.  A political body or 
institution is descriptively representative by literally resembling or reflecting the 
constituent elements of the community that it governs.  In contrast, substantive 
representation is concerned with what the representative actually does on behalf of the 
interests of the group he or she is associated with. 
The goal of this paper is to assess minority representation on the federal Court of 
Appeals, paying special attention to institutional features of federal appellate panels.  For 
ease of exposition, we refer to both non-whites and women as “minority” judges because 
both are in a small minority relative to white men on the federal bench. We demonstrate 
with argument and evidence that past studies of minority representation on federal 
appellate panels have relied on research designs that fail to accurately capture minority 
influence on legal policy.  Past research on this issue has examined only the individual 
voting behavior of minority judges, neglecting the fact that federal Court of Appeals 
cases are decided by majority vote on three judge panels (with the rare exception of en 
banc decisions). Thus, any adequate assessment of minority influence must consider not 
only the votes of minority judges, but also must investigate whether minority judges 
influence the decisions of other judges on their panels and thereby affect panel outcomes 
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 and legal policy.  Our findings demonstrate that the gender composition of a panel is a 
powerful predictor of panel decisions in discrimination cases, and that examining only 
individual-level variables measuring judges’ characteristics is inadequate for drawing 
inferences about the effects of minority judges’ influence on case outcomes.  This finding 
indicates the existence of an important factor that past studies of minority representation 
on federal appellate courts have missed, and points the way to new approaches to 
studying this issue. 
Advocates of racial and gender diversification of the judiciary have suggested that it 
will promote the value of descriptive representation by making the judiciary better 
resemble the public that it governs, and will thereby strengthen at least the appearance of 
judicial impartiality, as well as the judiciary’s legitimacy as a democratic institution 
(Smith 1994, 198; Tobias 1990, 177; Walker and Barrow 1985, 597). Proponents of 
diversification, however, have clearly desired and anticipated enhanced substantive 
representation as well. While bemoaning a federal bench “hostile to civil rights” at the 
close of the Reagan-Bush era, Barbara Arnwine, executive director of the Lawyers’ 
Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, called for more African-American appointments 
as a remedy (Smith 1994, 199). Regarding the appointment of more women judges, one 
judicial scholar explained:  “The organized campaign to place women on the bench rests 
on the hope that women judges will seize decision-making opportunities to liberate other 
women” (Cook 1981, 216). In particular, diversification advocates have expected that 
racial minorities and women on the bench would be more concerned about and 
responsive to questions of race and gender discrimination, and would actually render 
decisions more favorable to plaintiffs in such cases (Ifill 2000; Beiner 1999; Gregory 
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 1997; Tobias 1990; Martin 1990; Martin 1982; Goldman 1979), as well as help to 
develop legal doctrine in a direction more favorable to discrimination plaintiffs (Smith 
1994). 
The principal explanation given for the expectation that women and minority judges 
would produce legal policy more advantageous to plaintiffs in discrimination claims is 
that they are more likely to have encountered discrimination themselves (Beiner 1999; 
Songer, Davis, and Haire 1994; Martin 1990). That is, their different life experiences, as 
compared with white male judges, will make them more likely to believe a plaintiff’s 
proof of discrimination.  A survey of federal judges lends some support to the idea that 
female judges have a different perspective on discrimination than male judges.  When 
identifying “major” problems in the legal profession, 81 percent of the women judges in 
the survey mentioned sex discrimination, while among men none identified sex 
discrimination, and only 18.5 percent referred to racial or class bias (Martin 1990, 207). 
Similar findings exist for African-American judges.  A survey found that while 83 
percent of white judges believe that African-Americans are treated fairly in the American 
judicial system, only 18 percent of black judges held this view (Ifill 2000, 450). 
A number of high-ranking women judges have themselves suggested that they have 
brought their experiences as women to the bench.  Justice Christine Durham of the Utah 
Supreme Court stated that female judges “bring an individual and collective perspective 
to our work that cannot be achieved in a system which reflects the experience of only a 
part of the people whose lives it affects” (Tobias 1990, 177). With respect to anti-
discrimination law, Chief Judge Judith Kaye of the New York Court of Appeals (New 
York’s highest court) remarked:  “After a life-time of different experiences and a 
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 substantial period of survival in a male-dominated profession, women judges 
unquestionably have developed a heightened awareness of the problems that other 
women encounter in life and in law; it is not at all surprising that they remain particularly 
sensitive to these problems” (Tobias 1990, 178). 
To examine empirically the influence of race and gender on judicial decisions, as we 
do here, does not mean to indulge the facile notion that women or racial minority judges 
are homogeneous in their politics or values.  We emphatically do not believe that there is 
a monolithic “women’s perspective” or “minority perspective” among judges or anyone 
else.  However, in a society with a long history of race and gender discrimination, 
including discrimination inscribed into law, the assumption that the race and gender of 
judges will have no bearing upon the policy they make may be equally facile.  As 
discussed below, it would also be difficult to square with the empirical evidence. 
Our central question is whether and how racial minority and women judges, who will 
most frequently be in a numerical minority on panels governed by a majority vote, 
influence the votes of majority group panel members and thereby affect legal policy on 
issues thought by advocates of diversification to be of particular concern to women and 
minorities.  Using a sample of employment discrimination cases to probe this question, 
we find that institutional features of the federal Court of Appeals matter substantially.  
Where evidence of different preferences for minority judges exists, we find that the norm 
of unanimity on three-judge panels permits them to influence legal policy even when they 
are outnumbered on a panel.  Women but not racial minorities increase the likelihood of 
decisions for the plaintiff even when they are in the minority on a three-judge panel. 
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 The paper proceeds as follows.  In section 2 we review the literature on the influence 
of race and gender on judicial decision-making.  In section 3 we discuss how the 
institution of three judge panels might matter to minority representation and lay out the 
hypotheses we test in the paper.  Section 4 discusses the data and our analysis and section 
5 concludes. 
 
2.  Prior Studies of the Influence of Race and Gender on 
Judicial Decision-Making 
 
Over the past several decades, most empirical studies of judicial decision-making at the 
trial and appellate levels have been based largely on the attitudinal model of decision-
making (Segal and Spaeth 1993). The attitudinal model is oriented to explaining judicial 
decision making based upon “each judge’s political ideology and the identity of the 
parties” (Cross 1997, 265). This individualist orientation emphasizes the explanatory 
power of each judges’ sincere preferences independently of either legal doctrine or 
strategic considerations. 
Following this methodological orientation, empirical studies testing whether women 
and racial minority judges decide certain types of cases differently than their male and 
white counterparts have produced mixed results.  For example, in studies of criminal 
sentencing rulings at the state trial court level, scholars generally have not found 
significant differences between male and female judges (Gruhl, Spohn, and Welch 1981; 
Kritzer and Uhlman 1977). In other studies of state criminal sentencing, some researchers 
have found significant differences between African-American and white judges (Welch, 
Combs, and Gruhl 1988), while others have found no such racial differences (Uhlman 
1978). At the federal district court level, one study found no effects with respect to a 
 5
 judge’s race or gender in deciding civil rights cases (Walker and Barrow 1985), while 
another such study found no differences with respect to a judge’s race but modest 
differences along gender lines (Ashenfelter, Eisenberg, and Schwab 1995).1  One very 
interesting recent study found that while racial minority and female federal district court 
judges were not more likely to strike down the federal sentencing guidelines enacted in 
1988, of those judges who struck the guidelines, racial minority judges were far more 
likely to do so based upon a legal theory rooted in individual due process rights rather 
than a breach of separation of powers (Sisk, Heise, and Morriss 1998). The study’s 
authors concluded that minority judges showed “a tendency . . . to adopt a non-
mainstream approach, even if these judges reached the same general outcome at basically 
the same rate as white judges” (1459). 
With respect to federal Court of Appeals judges, one early study found that among 
Carter appointees, race and gender did not influence judges’ decisions in criminal, 
prisoner, and discrimination cases at a statistically significant level (Gotchall 1983). 
Subsequent research on federal appellate courts found that women were quite 
significantly more liberal than men in employment discrimination cases, but did not vote 
differently from men in criminal procedure or obscenity cases (Songer, Davis, and Haire 
1994; Davis, Haire, and Songer 1993). Most recently, researchers studying unfair labor 
practices (ULP) cases under the National Labor Relations Act found that Asian and 
Hispanic judges had a higher probability of ruling for management, and though African-
American judges were not more likely to decide ULP cases in general in favor of one 
party or the other, they were more prone to decide an important subset of the cases in 
                                                 
1It should be noted that the Walker and Barrow study, which reported non-findings with respect to both 
race and gender, was limited by a very small sample of racial minority and women judges. 
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 favor of unions.  Women judges, as a whole, did not favor either side in ULP suits, but 
female Republican judges were more likely to decide claims in favor of unions than male 
Republican judges (Brudney, Schiavoni, and Merritt 1999; Merritt and Brudney 2001). 
While studies of the influence of race and gender on judicial behavior have not 
produced broadly consistent results, a number of the studies have found systematic 
differences in decision-making by judges along racial and gender lines in the area of civil 
rights.  Moreover, while these differences ranged from modest to substantial in 
substantive magnitude, all of the positive findings were in the ideological direction 
anticipated by the advocates of diversification of the bench.  That is, women and racial 
minority judges appear, on average, to be somewhat more sympathetic to complaints of 
civil rights violations. 
Thus, the social scientific evidence supports the assumption that systematic 
differences sometimes exist in the views of racial minority and women judges that are 
more favorable to parties complaining of civil rights violations.  We develop our 
theoretical framework below assuming the existence of such differences because the 
purpose of the framework is to assess whether decisional output by federal appellate 
panels is influenced by the presence of women or minorities when such differences in 
viewpoint exist. While the relationship we posit in elaborating the framework between 
judges’ preferences and their race and gender is highly stylized, the simplifying 
assumption is necessary in order to pursue a systematic approach to addressing this 
research question.  We think that this assumption is most likely to hold for the kinds of 
cases studied here, yet we ultimately leave it for the data analysis to determine whether or 
not such relationships are borne out. 
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3.  The Neglected Importance Of Institutional Structure 
 
All of the studies discussed in the previous section were explicitly motivated by the 
general question of whether increasing representation of minorities on the bench 
produces any influence on judicial policy output, particularly in areas thought by 
advocates of diversification to be of special concern to minorities, such as anti-
discrimination law.  However, all of the prior scholarship on the Court of Appeals that we 
reviewed has examined the votes of individual judges in isolation, ignoring the specific 
institutional structure in which the judges were sitting.  This lack of attention to 
institutional context is especially problematic in studies of minority representation on 
appellate panels.  At the federal trial court level, when a minority trial judge sitting alone 
presides over a case, that judge has the authority to decide the case him or herself 
(though, of course, the character of the appellate structure can impose some constraint). 
At the federal appellate level, with three-judge panels on which a simple majority 
prevails, a single minority judge sitting on a panel with two members of the majority 
group lacks the power to decide anything alone.  Conversely, the two judges of the 
majority group possess the power to render binding decisions for the circuit that totally 
disregard the views of the minority. 
The probability of drawing two minority judges on a three-judge panel is substantially 
lower than the proportion of minority judges in the pool.  For example, suppose a circuit 
has 15 judges serving on it and 2 of those are racial minorities (this is about the average 
size of a circuit and the average number of racial minorities serving on a circuit today). 
The probability of drawing a panel that has two minorities is about 3 percent even though 
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 minorities constitute slightly more than 13 percent of the circuit.2  Thus, compared with 
federal district courts where each case is heard by a single judge, it is evident that the 
institution of the federal appellate panel has the potential to considerably dilute the 
translation of minority representation into doctrinal output representative of minority 
views where they differ from majority views.  In Pitkin’s terms, the institutional structure 
of appellate panels may obstruct the meaningful conversion of descriptive representation 
on the appellate bench into substantive representation. 
This potentially bleak consequence of the appellate panel structure for minority 
representation would appear to be the likely outcome of a theory of judicial decision-
making that ignores some important institutional features of appellate courts.  Assuming 
that the views of minority group judges differ systematically from judges of the majority 
group on a discrete body of cases, such as employment discrimination cases, and all 
judges vote their sincere preferences, we should expect to find the following.  Judges of 
the majority group will decide those cases in the same way regardless of whether they 
have a 3-0 majority or a 2-1 majority, since voting purely based on their attitudes yields 
adoption of the majority view in both cases. Where the panel is split 2-1 in favor of the 
majority group, the position of the majority judges will not be influenced by the minority 
judge.  The minority view will only be adopted in the very small proportion of cases in 
which there are two minority judges on the panel.  Finally, within categories of cases in 
which there are systematic differences between the views of majority and minority 
judges, this simple theoretical account would lead us to expect to see higher rates of 
                                                 
2This number is computed as follows.  Let M be the size of the circuit, K be the number of minorities on 
the circuit, n be the size of the panel, and x be the number of minorities on the panel.  Since we are 
sampling without replacement (i.e., we cannot pick a judge more than once for the same panel), then the 
probability of x can be computed from a hypergeometric distribution:   
 9
 dissent among minority group judges when they serve on panels with two majority group 
judges, and among majority group judges when they serve on panels with two minority 
group judges. 
However, it appears empirically that this simple theoretical account is incorrect.  
Federal appellate panels are overwhelmingly unanimous, with dissent rates aggregated 
across all circuits averaging approximately 6 to 8 percent, varying somewhat with respect 
to issue area (Songer 1986; Goldman 1975). These extremely high rates of consensus on 
federal appellate panels prevail even within particularly contentious issue areas, where 
measures of individual judges’ voting and measures of panel outcomes show wide 
ideological variation (Atkins and Green 1976). Even where there is systematic 
disagreement among judges with respect to some substantive category of cases and there 
is wide ideological variation across panel decisions in such cases, panels nevertheless 
achieve unanimous decisions in the overwhelming majority of those cases.  Panel 
unanimity appears to mask disagreement among panel members. 
From the perspective of investigating the consequences of the appellate panel 
structure for minority representation, the question that immediately arises is what 
happens to the minority view on panels that are divided, for example, along racial, 
gender, or ideological lines?  Are minority dissents being suppressed without influencing 
the panel’s decision, or are they being withheld as part of a process through which the 
minority judge influences the content of the panel decision?  
A number of hypotheses have been advanced to explain the phenomenon of panel 
unanimity, which is so prevalent that judicial scholars refer to it as a “norm” (e.g., 
McIver 1976, 757; see also Goldman 1968 and Songer 1986). Although these hypotheses 
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 have not been considered in connection with the issue of minority representation, they 
have important implications for it.  One set of explanations holds that a judge on a panel 
who disagrees with the panel majority acquiesces in the majority’s brute numerical force, 
and signs on to an opinion with which he or she disagrees, without influencing the 
decision’s content. These explanations for unanimity are (1) workload, (2) a coercive 
consensus norm, and (3) the loneliness of dissent.  We refer to these explanations 
collectively as “suppressed dissent” hypotheses for explaining panel unanimity.  In this 
scenario, on a panel split 2-1 in favor of the majority group, the two majority group 
judges vote their sincere attitudes while the minority judge does not. 
The workload explanation is that federal appellate judges simply have too much work 
to do sitting on panels and writing their assigned majority opinions.  Their heavy 
workload restrains them from taking on the extra work of writing dissenting opinions, 
particularly given that such opinions do not affect the outcome of the case and carry no 
precedential weight (Songer 1986; Green 1986; Atkins and Green 1976).3  The coercive 
consensus norm refers to the idea that among appellate judges on a panel, “social 
pressure exists . . . for the judge to adhere to the dominant value or position expressed in 
a decision” (Atkins 1973, 43), and that a consensus norm underwritten by this social 
pressure amounts to a “behavioral restriction” (Atkins and Green 1976). This norm is said 
to be motivated by a view among judges that dissenting opinions create legal uncertainty, 
reduce the court’s credibility, and may even provoke opposition to a decision (Atkins 
1973). Finally, judicial politics scholars have theorized that judges who disagree with a 
panel decision may withhold their dissent, in part, due to the “intrinsic loneliness of 
dissent” (Songer 1982, 227; Atkins and Green 1976, 738, n.  2). 
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 If any of these three suppressed dissent hypotheses are correct, the effect is the same 
for purposes of the present discussion.  Within categories of cases in which the views of 
majority and minority judges differ systematically, panel unanimity would be masking 
the failure of minority judges to influence legal policy in all but the few cases in which 
they constitute a majority of the panel. 
However, there is a second set of explanations for the unanimity of appellate panels 
that, if true, would yield a more optimistic conclusion about how appellate panels 
mediate minority representation into legal policy.  This set of explanations contemplates 
that the process by which a dissent is withheld involves the moderation of the majority 
view toward the would-be dissenter’s preferred position. These explanations are (1) 
deliberation, (2) a norm of consensus through bargaining, and (3) fear of “whistle-
blowing.” We refer to these explanations collectively as “modified content” hypotheses 
for explaining panel unanimity.  In this scenario, on a unanimous panel divided 2-1 in 
favor of the majority group, neither the two majority group judges nor the minority group 
judge vote their sincere preferences, but rather they achieve a compromise decision 
between their respective ideal points. 
The deliberation explanation is straightforward, and is most consistent with the 
conventional legal model of decision making on a multi-judge panel.  According to this 
view, sitting on an appellate panel is a collegial and not an isolated decision-making 
process. Judges take one another’s views seriously in the deliberative process, and this 
will tend to cause judges on a heterogeneous panel to moderate their views toward the 
center as compared to judges on a homogeneous panel (Revesz 1997; Kornhauser and 
Sager 1993). 
                                                                                                                                                 
3However, as we discuss below, dissents may have a “whistle-blowing” effect. 
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 The norm of consensus through bargaining is motivated by the same concerns as the 
coercive consensus norm—fear that dissents promote legal uncertainty, reduce the court’s 
credibility, and possibly diminish compliance.  According to this view, judges deliberate 
“in a spirit of ‘give-and-take’ (or accommodation) in an effort to reach decisional 
consensus and thus avoid public dissension” (Goldman 1968, 479–80). As one judge put 
it, emphasizing why a dissenter who is not entirely happy with a panel decision might 
sign on:  “Often a judge would rather bargain with his peers and achieve a decision, 
although not as broad-sweeping as he would want but nevertheless in the right direction, 
than write a ringing dissent while having no influence on the outcome of the case” 
(Goldman 1968, 479–80). 
Finally, the whistle-blower hypothesis holds that in circumstances in which the 
preferred majority holding is contrary to legal doctrine, the public filing of a dissent 
identifying the deviation from doctrine would alert others of the majority’s transgression, 
most importantly the larger circuit and the Supreme Court, both of which could overturn 
the decision.  Because this would increase the chances of reversal, the threat of the 
dissent will cause the majority to comply with doctrine, and this will cause the dissenter 
to join, making the decision unanimous (Cross and Tiller 1998). 
If any of these three modified content hypotheses are correct, then panel unanimity 
need not entail neglect of minority group views on panels with one minority judge.  
Instead, the existence of unanimity would reflect substantive modifications of the 
majority view in the direction of the minority, as compared with panels of three majority 
judges.  If this were true, the unanimity norm on appellate panels would be functioning to 
facilitate rather than impede substantive minority representation. 
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 Our empirical analysis tests whether the evidence supports the suppressed dissent 
hypotheses or the modified content hypotheses as applied to heterogeneous panels.  That 
is, we seek to determine whether, in panels divided along racial, gender, or ideological 
lines, the presence of minority judges influences the content of panel decisions.  Some 
recent innovative scholarship has found that in certain types of ideologically sensitive 
cases, the ideological composition of an appellate panel, as measured by the party of the 
appointing president of each of the judges, exerts significant influence on the judges’ 
votes (Revesz 1997; Cross and Tiller 1998). For example, a Democrat is markedly more 
likely to vote conservatively when sitting on a panel with two Republicans, as compared 
to sitting on an ideologically unified panel of three Democrats. 
Drawing upon this approach, we examine the panel-level effects—that is, the effects 
of panel composition—in terms of minority representation on panels deciding 
employment discrimination cases. While our data does not enable us to choose with 
confidence among the specific hypotheses that fall under the general categories of 
suppressed dissent or modified content, we can test between the two categories.  If we 
find that the probability of an outcome in favor of a civil rights plaintiff increases when 
only one minority serves on a panel, this would be evidence in favor of the modified 
content hypotheses.  If the probability increases further when a second minority is added 
to the panel, this would suggest that achieving a panel majority allowed the minority 
judges to move the outcome in a more liberal direction.  If the probability of a ruling for 
the plaintiff does not increase further when a second minority is added to the panel, this 
suggests one of two things.  First, if minority representation is modifying the content of 
decisions through deliberation or bargaining, it simply may be that the increase in 
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 liberality thus achieved satisfies the preferences of minority group judges even when they 
are in a majority on the panel.  Second, as we discuss below, a panel with two minorities 
may regard itself as a more likely target for review, and may be restrained by this concern 
from moving in a more liberal direction.  If we find that the probability of an outcome in 
favor of a civil rights plaintiff does not increase when one minority serves on a panel but 
does increase when two serve, this would be evidence in favor of the suppressed dissent 
hypotheses. We would interpret this result as indicating that the more liberal votes of 
minority judges when they are in a majority better represent their sincere preferences, 
which are not influencing outcomes when only one serves on a panel.  Finally, if we find 
that neither one nor two minorities serving on a panel affects the probability of an 
outcome for the plaintiff, this could simply indicate that there is no difference between 
the views of minority group and majority group judges as evaluated by the measure of 
case outcome. 
While the key focus of this analysis is on how panel-level variables affect case 
outcomes, the theoretical development also suggests that we need to be concerned with 
the effects of circuit-level variables. Legal doctrine varies substantially across circuits, 
especially with respect to more divisive doctrinal areas such as employment 
discrimination law.  Circuits are able to enforce their views against potentially wayward 
panels through the en banc review process, or the threat of it. 
Cameron, Segal, and Songer (2000) provide persuasive evidence that the ideological 
composition of a Court of Appeals panel is a cue used by the Supreme Court as an 
efficient auditing mechanism in selecting cases for review in their effort to control lower 
courts.  They find that the greater the ideological distance between the Supreme Court 
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 and a Court of Appeals panel, measured as a function of the party of the appointing 
president, the greater the probability that the Supreme Court will review the case, 
controlling for case facts and case outcome.  Likewise, it is plausible that when minority 
judges constitute a majority on a panel addressing anti-discrimination law, they will 
recognize themselves as more likely to be scrutinized for review by their circuit en banc 
and the Supreme Court.  The institutional constraints imposed by the circuit may cause 
them to refrain from moving further in their preferred direction than when there is one 
minority on a panel.  The potential for whistle-blowing may magnify this effect.  
Although a female or a racial minority judge may be an effective whistle-blower when 
they are in the minority on a panel, females or racial minorities can have the whistle 
blown on them when they constitute a majority.  Whatever the source of the concern 
about review, it is important to account for institutional effects at the circuit level in order 
to obtain reliable estimates of the effects at the individual judge and panel levels.4  
Past studies of the influence of minority representation on Court of Appeals decision-
making in civil rights cases have neglected the key institutional variable of the circuit in 
which the panel is situated.5  According to theoretical accounts that emphasize judges’ 
sincere preferences as an explanation for their voting patterns, the ideological 
composition of the circuit is not a matter of great concern.  As we will see in the 
                                                 
4Note that the small percentage of cases that are reviewed en banc or by the Supreme Court is not evidence 
that such reviews are not effective in policing panel decisions or that whistle-blowing is not a concern of 
judges. Forward-looking judges should anticipate the possibility of review and adjust their decisions to 
avoid it, which would lead to a small percentage of cases actually being reviewed. 
5Indeed, we are aware of only two recent related studies of the effects of judges’ race and gender on 
decision-making to have included circuit variables.  These studies analyzed decisions under the National 
Labor Relations Act, a substantive area of law not identified by advocates of diversification of the judiciary 
as one in which differences in decision-making were anticipated (Brudney, Schiavoni, and Merritt 1999; 
Merritt and Brudney 2001). 
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 empirical analysis reported in the next section, however, the circuit in which panels 
decide cases has a significant influence on the ideological direction of panel decisions. 
 
4.  Data and Empirical Analysis 
 
Our data consists of a random sample of 400 published federal Court of Appeals 
employment discrimination cases decided in 1998 and 1999, 200 from each year.6  
Scholars studying publication of Court of Appeals decisions have shown that they may 
differ from unpublished decisions regarding how often particular issues are raised, that 
the rate of publication varies across circuits and across judges (Merritt and Brudney 
2001), and that the population of published decisions may not be representative of all 
cases litigated regarding some case characteristics (Eisenberg and Schwab 1989). These 
studies counsel that researchers must take care to sample from a pool of cases best suited 
to answer their particular research question.  Our fundamental concern is the influence of 
minority representation, if any, on the development of legal policy, and thus published 
decisions are the appropriate object of study.  Published Court of Appeals opinions are 
binding law on all subsequent panels and all district judges in the circuit unless 
overturned by the circuit en banc or the Supreme Court.7  
We take our sample from two recent years rather than over a longer period for two 
reasons.  First, due to the significant increase of women and minorities on the federal 
appellate bench over the past decade, sampling from this period increased our chances of 
                                                 
6The sample was drawn from the pool of published cases in the Westlaw database classified under 
Westlaw headnotes for employment discrimination cases, or with reference to any employment 
discrimination statute in the case summary. 
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 drawing a sufficient number of cases with women and minority judges to render reliable 
findings.  Second, by sampling within a narrow temporal frame, we aim to isolate the 
influence of judges’ race and gender on panel decisions from significant changes over 
time in pertinent Supreme Court or circuit doctrine, variables that can influence case 
outcomes and can be difficult to account for. 
We examine employment discrimination cases for a number of reasons. As discussed 
above, anti-discrimination law is the domain in which advocates of diversification of the 
judiciary expect to find differences in decision making by women and racial minority 
judges, and it is an area in which some past studies have found such differences.  
Furthermore, employment discrimination cases are the most common type of suit filed in 
federal court.  In the five years from 1996 to 2000, the number of such federal suits 
ranged between 21,000 and 23,000 per year, averaging approximately 8.5 percent of the 
total federal cases filed annually.8  Thus, by examining employment discrimination 
claims we are able to both focus on anti-discrimination law and a case type that is a staple 
of today’s federal court docket.   
We test models with two closely related but analytically distinct units of analysis.  
The first is each individual judge’s vote for either the plaintiff or the defendant, and the 
second is whether the case outcome is for the plaintiff or the defendant.  Individual 
judges’ votes must be analyzed to directly assess whether and to what extent the votes of 
majority group judges are influenced by minority group judges on a panel.  The case-
level outcome must also be analyzed to gauge the influence of minority judges on case 
                                                                                                                                                 
7Judge Patricia Wald of the District of Columbia Circuit characterized writing published decisions as 
writing “for the law books,” while describing unpublished decisions as “a class of legal ‘untouchables’ ” 
that “cannot be cited as authority for any proposition” (Wald 1995, 1373). 
8Judicial Business of the United States Courts, 2000 Annual Report of the Director, Table C-2A. 
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 outcomes and thus legal policy, which is the question that motivates this study.  The 
individual vote analysis directly models dynamics among panel members, and the case 
outcome analysis measures the results of those dynamics for legal policy.  The more 
strongly the norm of unanimity operates in our sample, the higher the rate at which 
individual judges’ votes will correspond to case outcomes, and thus the more 
convergence there will be in the results produced by the two levels of analysis.  While we 
expect a high degree of consistency between the individual level and the panel level 
results given the norm of unanimity, we test this expectation rather than assuming it. 
We coded each judge’s decision as one for a pro-plaintiff (liberal) vote, and zero for a 
pro-defendant (conservative) vote, and coded case outcome likewise.  For decisions in 
which some issues were decided for the plaintiff and others for the defendant, if one party 
was substantially victorious over the other we coded the case as having been decided for 
that party.  If a ruling was roughly evenly split, so that there was no clear victor, it was 
not included in the sample. 
It must be emphasized that the task of measuring how a minority judge on a multi-
judge court might influence an opinion is a difficult one. The most clearly observable 
manifestation of influence is to increase the probability of a decision in favor of the 
plaintiff, which is the measure we use here.  However, changing the outcome entirely 
from the defendant to the plaintiff is the most extreme form of influence.  A great deal of 
the bargaining and deliberation among judges focuses on how to frame a decision once it 
is decided which party will prevail (Epstein and Knight 1998). Judges almost always 
have choices between framing a decision in terms that range from having minimal or no 
policy consequences for future cases, to having far reaching influence on a large class of 
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 future cases.  For example, often in the same case a decision could (1) be hinged on the 
particular configuration of facts in the case, giving it minimal policy consequences, (2) be 
resolved by the announcement of a broad rule with profound policy consequences, or (3) 
be disposed of with some intermediate formulation.  Judges have latitude in deciding 
whether to include alternative holdings in an opinion, or whether to include dicta 
(material not necessary to support the holding), which, while lacking strict precedential 
weight, can powerfully influence the development of doctrine.  Cases also often involve 
multiple issue dimensions, leaving judges ample room to decide how to frame and/or 
bundle the issues in a decision (Segal 1997), which can have important doctrinal 
consequences.  As noted above, a recent study found that although racial minority district 
judges were not more likely than white judges to strike down the federal sentencing 
guidelines enacted in 1988, among those judges who struck the guidelines, racial 
minorities were far more prone to do so based upon a legal theory rooted in individual 
due process rights rather than a breach of separation of powers (Sisk, Heise, and Morriss, 
1998). While a purely outcome-based measurement would not detect this important 
difference, the precedent founded on individual rights will be far more likely to have 
future doctrinal value to advocates of criminal defendants than will a precedent based 
upon a breach of separation of powers.  In sum, there is a vast array of choices and 
material for minority and majority group judges to deliberate on and bargain over in 
employment discrimination cases short of whether the ruling will be in favor of the 
plaintiff or the defendant. 
If any of the modified content hypotheses are correct, then deliberation or negotiation 
over these types of issues could explain why a minority judge would join a panel decision 
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 for a defendant even in a case in which he or she would have preferred an outcome for 
the plaintiff.  While judicial politics scholars have studied this type of bargaining in close 
case studies of Supreme Court decisions, relying upon written communications between 
judges and progressive drafts of opinions as evidence (Epstein and Knight 1998; 
Maltzman, Spriggs, and Wahlbeck 2001), such data is not available for a Court of 
Appeals study the size of ours.  For this reason, the only evidence we can use to test for 
minority influence on substantive output is whether it is actually causing a greater 
proportion of cases to be decided for the plaintiff.  Since we are only able to test for this 
most extreme form of influence, we are conducting a very conservative test for the 
existence of minority influence.  To the extent that we do find minority influence on 
outcomes, this is compelling evidence in support of the conclusion that minority judges 
are influencing substantive decision-making in favor of plaintiffs in other, more subtle 
ways. We contend that evidence that minority judges increase the probability of a panel 
outcome for the plaintiff would represent the tip of the iceberg. 
We include a number of explanatory variables measuring judge characteristics in our 
models.  The key variables of interest are gender (female=1, male=0) and race (racial 
minority=1, white=0).9  In addition to gender and race, we accounted for factors that prior 
studies have found to be related to judges’ voting patterns in ideologically divisive issue 
areas such as employment discrimination cases.  A number of past studies have found 
that the party affiliation of the appointing president is significantly correlated with the 
ideological direction of a judge’s decisions at the Court of Appeals level (Cross and Tiller 
                                                 
9Racial minorities include African-American, Hispanic, and Asian judges.  Our source for coding judges’ 
race and gender was the Federal Judicial Center’s biographical data, which can be found at http: 
//air.fjc.gov/history.  We also estimated specifications that accounted for the age of judges, which did not 
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 1998; Revesz 1997; Songer, Davis, and Haire 1994), and the district court level (Rowland 
and Carp 1996). Giles, Hettinger, and Peppers (2001; n.d.) contend that using the 
common space NOMINATE scores of the appointing president computed by Poole 
(1998) is superior to using variables that indicate the party of the appointing president.  
Their argument is that NOMINATE scores pick up the variation in ideology that exists 
across presidents of the same party but is ignored by party dummy variables.  They find 
that NOMINATE scores are better predictors of individual judges’ voting decisions than 
are party variables.  Following their lead, we report results using NOMINATE scores as a 
general measure of ideology for judges.10  
Case characteristics can also have a significant influence on judges’ decisions.  
Researchers have found that variation in judges’ voting can be explained by case facts 
and the identity of the litigants (Songer, Davis, and Haire 1994; Songer and Haire 1992; 
Songer and Sheehan 1992). We coded these characteristics for each case in the analysis.  
With respect to case facts, we coded the protected classification alleged to be the basis of 
the discrimination (e.g., race, gender, religion, age, national origin, disability, or some 
combination of these; we leave out the dummy variable for disability discrimination, 
making it the referent), as well as whether there were allegations of a “hostile 
environment,” such as sexual or racial harassment.11  We also include dummy variables 
                                                                                                                                                 
have statistically significant effects, and so for the sake of parsimony we left them out of the models 
reported below. 
10Larger or more positive NOMINATE scores indicate more conservative presidents/judges.  Giles et.  al.  
also account for senatorial courtesy in appointments by including the common space NOMINATE score of 
relevant senators in their models.  We do not include measures of senators’ ideology because it would 
require weighting senators’ ideology against presidents’ ideology and it is not clear what the weights 
should be.  We also estimated models using party indicators, but the specifications with the NOMINATE 
scores generally fit the data better.  The main results on the gender and race variables reported below did 
not change significantly across the different specifications. 
11While Songer, Davis, and Haire (1992) included in their analysis of employment discrimination cases 
variables measuring evidence of past discrimination, whether the relief sought involved quotas or 
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 that indicate whether or not the case involved claims of reverse gender or racial 
discrimination.  Regarding the identity of the parties, we coded whether the defendant 
was a governmental entity (government defendant=1, other=0), and whether the plaintiff 
was the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC plaintiff=1, other=0). Past 
researchers have also found that whether the plaintiff or defendant is appealing the trial 
court decision may be a significant predictor of the outcome on appeal (Clermont and 
Eisenberg 2001; Eisenberg and Schwab 1989), and thus we included a set of dummy 
variables to account for whether the plaintiff, defendant, or both parties appealed 
(plaintiff appeal=1 if plaintiff appealed, =0 otherwise; both appeal=1 if both the plaintiff 
and the defendant appealed, =0 otherwise; this makes appeal by the defendant the 
reference category). These variables also indicate the direction of the lower court 
decision since an appeal by one party indicates a decision in favor of the other.  We also 
coded the cases for whether the lower court decision on appeal was a pretrial or post-trial 
ruling (posture=0 if post-trial; =1 if pretrial). 
Finally, we include circuit-level effects in our model, which should account for both 
constraints on judges’ decisions imposed by concerns about being overturned by the 
circuit en banc, as well as the ideological tilt of a particular circuit’s doctrine.  Further, 
the circuit-level effects are necessary due to possible variation in the nature of claims 
arising in different circuits (Brudney, Schiavoni, and Merritt 1999). Circuit effects are 
operationalized with a set of dummy variables indicating the circuit in which the case was 
                                                                                                                                                 
affirmative action, whether the relief sought would affect seniority rights, and whether an amicus brief was 
filed, preliminary analysis showed these variables to be insignificant, and since they are not theoretically 
central to our analysis, we excluded them to avoid cluttering up the model. 
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 litigated.12  The reference category for the circuit dummies is the 9th Circuit, which we 
expect to be the most plaintiff-friendly given its liberal bent.13  
With respect to predicting individual judge’s votes, we model panel-level effects 
explicitly by including a battery of variables that indicate the gender, racial, and 
ideological profile of a judge’s colleagues on the panel, and with respect to predicting 
case outcomes we include variables indicating the same characteristics for all three 
judges on the panel.  Although including these sets of dummy variables consumes several 
degrees of freedom, this approach is superior to including one ordinal variable for each of 
the panel’s characteristics we are interested in.  For example, we could indicate the 
number of female colleagues serving on the panel by including a variable which ranges 
between zero and two (in our sample there are no cases where three women serve on the 
panel). But this would impose monotonicity in the effects of this variable, which could 
lead to the wrong inferences about panel-level effects.  That is, the approach would 
constrain the marginal effect of the variable to be the same whether the change on the 
panel is from zero to one female colleague, or one to two female colleagues.  If there is 
an effect only when two women serve on the panel (i.e., they constitute a majority), we 
                                                 
12Although the circuit dummies are a rather crude way to measure circuit-level factors, we think they are 
superior to other alternatives.  We also estimated a model with circuit composition variables for race, 
gender, and party of the appointing president.  These variables, while perhaps less crude than the dummies, 
miss aspects of circuit doctrine not related to race, gender, or party, as well as variation in the substance of 
circuit caseloads. We also tried including the mean of the common-space NOMINATE scores for the 
judges on the circuit to account for circuit ideology, and constructed a general measure of ideology, though 
it was so highly correlated with party that we saw little value added to putting it in our model.  The results 
reported below on the main gender and race variables were robust to all of these different 
operationalizations of circuit-level effects and tests indicated that it is necessary to include variables 
accounting for circuit effects in order to avoid misspecification bias.  Another approach to accounting for 
circuit-level factors would be to use a hierarchical model, where coefficients on explanatory variables are 
allowed to vary across circuits.  This is a potentially fruitful approach, but would require a great many more 
cases within each circuit than we have in our sample and thus is left to future work. 
13The results reported below were robust to using other circuits as the reference category.  In some cases, 
judges serve on the panels “by designation” though they do not sit on the circuit where the case was heard.  
The circuit dummy for these cases is still the circuit where the case was litigated. 
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 could obtain a positive and statistically significant coefficient.  But this would imply an 
increase in the probability of the dependent variable equaling one when the value of the 
ordinal variable changed from zero to one, even though there is no real increase in the 
probability when only one woman is added to the panel.  A better approach is to allow the 
marginal effect to be different depending upon the number of female colleagues on the 
panel.  Including a dummy variable that has a value of one if at least one female 
colleague serves on the panel and a dummy variable that has a value of one if at least two 
female colleagues serve on the panel allows us to properly assess the effect of going from 
zero to one and from one to two women on the panel. “Dummying out” the gender and 
race variables is thus superior to including ordinal variables.  The variable accounting for 
the ideological positions of a judge’s colleagues is simply the mean of their NOMINATE 
scores. 
Additionally, we need to allow the effects of the colleague dummy variables to vary 
depending on the race and gender of the judge in question.  For example, if the judge is 
female then having one female colleague on the panel implies that it is majority female.  
But if the judge in question is male, having one female colleague implies that the panel is 
majority male.  The inferences drawn from the coefficient on the one female colleague 
dummy are thus very different for male and female judges.  Further, if we estimated only 
one coefficient for both genders for the one female colleague variable we would not be 
able to isolate the influence of female judges on male judges, which is a central object of 
our inquiry.  Proper tests of our hypotheses require estimating separate coefficients for 
different genders and racial groups. 
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 Our sample limits us somewhat in our ability to test hypotheses about panel-level 
effects because it does not include cases where only women or racial minorities served on 
the panel.  Such cases are extremely rare.  The dummies for gender and race indicate 
whether at least one or at least two female colleagues served on the panel, and whether at 
least one or at least two racial minority colleagues served on the panel.  However, with 
our sample we are able to estimate coefficients on the variables measuring two female or 
two racial minority colleagues on the panel only for male and white judges, respectively.  
Descriptive statistics for the variables included in the empirical model appear in table 1. 
Before we discuss our results, we note that, consistent with past studies, there were 
dissents in approximately 5 percent of the cases in our sample (21 of 400). We found no 
statistically significant relationship between panels divided along racial or gender lines 
and the occurrence of dissents.  Thus, the norm of unanimity prevails in our sample of 
employment discrimination cases even on heterogeneous panels. 
The results of the logit analysis of individual judges’ votes are reported in table 2. For 
purposes of comparison, we estimated models with and without panel composition 
variables.  In the absence of panel composition variables, we find that the gender of the 
judge and the NOMINATE score of the president who appointed him or her affect the 
vote (see the columns for Model 1 in table 2). The coefficients on gender and ideology 
are bounded away from zero and indicate that a female judge is about 10 percent more 
likely to vote for the plaintiff.14  A judge with a NOMINATE score that is one standard 
deviation above the median (and thus more conservative) is 4 percent less likely to do so.  
                                                 
14Marginal effects were determined by simulating probabilities.  The values of all of the variables included 
in the model were set to their median values and then the value of a specific variable was varied from zero 
to one or vice versa for the dummy variables or perturbed one standard deviation for the continuous 
variables in order to determine its marginal effect. 
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 A judge’s race does not affect his or her probability of favoring the plaintiff as measured 
by case outcome. Several of the variables measuring case characteristics have statistically 
significant effects at the .05 level or better.  A claim of harassment increases the 
probability of voting for the plaintiff, while a claim of reverse race discrimination 
decreases this probability.  A judge is more likely to vote to overturn a decision in favor 
of a plaintiff than a decision for a defendant.  Nine out of the eleven circuit dummies are 
significant at the .05 level or better, and indicate that all but the 6th and 11th circuits are 
less likely to produce decisions in favor of the plaintiff than the 9th Circuit. Accounting 
for circuit-level effects is clearly an important part of the model specification.  A Wald 
test for excluding the circuit dummies gives a 211 statistic of 88.22 (p<.0001). This 
indicates that past studies of minority representation on the Court of Appeals which have 
examined individual votes without accounting for these institutional effects have 
produced somewhat biased results due to the omission of relevant variables. 
The results from the logit model that includes the panel composition variables 
(reported in the columns for Model 2 of table 2) lead us to different inferences about the 
influence of gender and ideology.  When the gender composition variables are included, 
we still find that the coefficient on the gender of the individual judge is statistically 
distinguishable from zero.  The variable that indicates the presence of one female 
colleague on the panel has a positive and statistically significant coefficient for males but 
not for females.  The marginal effect of this variable is to increase the probability that a 
male judge votes for the plaintiff by 19 percentage points, nearly double the marginal 
effect of a judge’s individual gender when the panel-level variables are excluded.  The 
marginal effect for the variable measuring the individual judge’s gender is also about 19 
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 percent.  Our interpretation of this result is that when one woman serves on a panel, the 
men on that panel tend to vote more liberally, and at about the same rate as women.  This 
finding makes sense given the norm of unanimity and supports the modified content 
hypotheses.  Whether through deliberation or bargaining she is able to increase the 
likelihood that the men will find for the plaintiff, or they are concerned about the woman 
acting as a whistle-blower in cases in which they otherwise may have departed from 
doctrine, it is evident that men vote differently when there is at least one woman serving 
on a panel with them, ceteris paribus. 
However, the coefficient on the dummy variable indicating the presence of at least 
two women on the panel as distinguished from one is not bounded away from zero for 
male judges.  In combination with the statistical insignificance of the variable for female 
judges indicating one female colleague, this means that having a majority of women on 
the panel does not increase the probability that either male or female judges on the panel 
will vote for the plaintiff over the increase that occurs when there is one woman serving 
on the panel. This finding is consistent with three alternative interpretations. The first is 
that if minority representation is modifying the content of decisions through deliberation 
or bargaining when there is one women on a panel, it simply may be that the increase in 
liberality thus achieved satisfies the preferences of women judges even when they are in a 
majority on the panel.  The second is that, while a second woman on a panel does not 
increase the probability that the other two judges will vote for the plaintiff, there may be 
other pro-plaintiff influences on non-outcome based dimensions of legal policy that are 
achieved within a decision for a given party.  The third is that, as suggested by the 
whistle-blower/auditing argument, if two women on a panel regard increasing the 
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 liberality of their decision to be more likely to provoke a dissent and/or attract review by 
the circuit en banc or the Supreme Court, they may be constrained from using their 
numerical majority to decide cases in favor of civil rights plaintiffs at a higher rate than 
panels with one woman.15  
None of the coefficients on the variables pertaining to race have effects that are 
statistically distinguishable from zero.  Neither the race of the individual judge nor the 
racial composition of the panel affects judges’ votes in a systematic way.  This result is 
consistent with two alternative interpretations.  Either racial minority judges do not hold 
views different from white judges on employment discrimination claims as measured by 
case outcome, or if they do, they are suppressing their dissents without influencing the 
case outcome.16   
The results for the general ideological composition of the panel are similar to our 
findings regarding gender composition.  The NOMINATE scores of a judge’s colleagues 
                                                 
15One might argue that the finding on the two women dummy is being driven by the fact that if two 
women are on a panel, it is likely that one of them is a Republican-appointed judge who would be less 
plaintiff-friendly and would therefore negate the influence of the Democratic-appointed woman.  We 
included additional panel composition dummy variables to account for gender-party combinations.  Adding 
these variables actually strengthened the result on the variable indicating the presence of a single woman 
(regardless of party) on the panel, while the two women variable remained insignificant.  We also tried an 
alternative specification where the set of panel composition dummy variables indicated the presence of 
exactly one women, exactly two women, etc.  The marginal effects of these variables would give the 
change in the probability between having zero and one woman on the panel, zero and two women on the 
panel, etc.  The results of this specification were approximately the same as those reported above. Finally, 
we estimated an alternative specification where we interacted the gender variable with the variables 
indicating claims of gender discrimination and reverse gender discrimination in order to account for 
possible changes in the liberal/conservation interpretation of a vote for the plaintiff.  The coefficients on 
these interaction terms proved to be statistically insignificant and left the qualitative results for other 
variables unchanged. 
16We also estimated a model separating judges into more detailed racial classifications.  In our sample, a 
larger proportion of Hispanic judges than African-American judges were appointed by Republicans.  
Grouping these Hispanic and African-American judges together might mask the effects of race. However, 
we did not find different results when we included separate indicators for each race represented in the 
sample.  Further, as with the gender variable, we estimated an alternative specification in which we 
interacted the judge’s race with variables indicating a claim of racial discrimination and reverse racial 
discrimination.  The interaction terms did not have effects that were statistically distinguishable from zero, 
nor did their inclusion significantly alter the results on other variables. 
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 on a panel affects his or her decision, in addition to his or her own NOMINATE score.  A 
one standard deviation increase in the average NOMINATE score of a judge’s colleagues 
reduces the likelihood of a finding for the plaintiff by 24 percentage points.  This is 
almost double the size of the marginal effect for the judge’s own NOMINATE score.  A 
Wald test indicates that the panel composition variables significantly improve the fit of 
the model—the Wald 25 statistic is 21.44 (p=0.001)—indicating the model would be 
misspecified without these variables. 
The results obtained for the other variables common to Model 2 and Model 1 are 
essentially the same.  The same case characteristic variables are statistically significant in 
Model 2 as in Model 1. Eight of the eleven circuit dummies are statistically significant, 
and the Wald test again indicates that they significantly improve the fit of the model, 
giving a 211 value of 63.75 (p<0.0001). 
To sum up the key results, the effects of gender and ideology on individual judges’ 
votes are not driven solely by a judge’s own gender or general ideological position; the 
gender composition of the panel influences the behavior of male judges and the general 
ideological composition of the panel influences the way all judges on a panel vote.  The 
presence of one woman on the panel appears to affect male judges’ votes in a way that is 
consistent with the modified content hypotheses.  Had we not included panel composition 
variables in the model, we would have dramatically underestimated the substantive 
significance of gender and ideology.  Yet neither the race of individual judges nor the 
racial composition of panels appear to influence outcomes in employment discrimination 
cases. 
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 Given the low rate of dissents in our sample, we expect that the patterns of individual 
voting behavior by judges described above accurately reflect the influence of minority 
representation on case outcomes and legal policy.  To test this directly, we rerun the 
model using case outcome, rather than individual judges’ votes, as the dependent 
variable.  Table 3 shows that the results at the case outcome level are indeed highly 
consistent with those at the level of individual judge’s votes.  The variable indicating the 
presence of at least one woman on the panel has both a statistically and substantively 
significant effect, increasing the probability of an outcome favoring the plaintiff by about 
20 percent.  However, as before, adding another woman to the panel gives no additional 
benefit to the plaintiff.  The general ideological makeup of the panel matters, while its 
racial composition does not.  The results on the rest of the variables in the model 
resemble what we found in our previous analyses. 
We conducted a robustness check using Generalized Estimating Equations (GEEs) to 
bolster confidence in our key results.  While we are interested in individual judges’ 
decisions, a judge-level analysis is open to the criticism that it underestimates the size of 
the true standard errors because it assumes that we have more independent pieces of 
information than we actually have.  It is reasonable to say that observations on judges 
serving on the same three-judge panel are correlated in ways that we are not able to 
observe.  A standard regression analysis would assume that all observations on judges are 
independent.  If they are not, the use of standard regression techniques could result in 
overconfidence in the precision of our estimates and lead to incorrect conclusions about 
the statistical significance of estimated coefficients, particularly on the panel composition 
variables.  GEEs, which allow us to account for unobserved correlation among 
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 observations, offer a solution to this problem (see Zorn 2001).17  GEEs relax assumptions 
about the independence of observations, which makes them particularly useful when 
examining collegial decision-making bodies whose members interact in ways that we do 
not observe but are likely to affect their behavior. Observations are grouped into clusters, 
and then parameters are estimated to model the correlations among observations in the 
cluster. With circuit court decisions, each three-judge panel represents a cluster.18  
Table 4 reports GEE estimates of our model as a robustness check on our logit 
estimates.19  We estimated an “exchangeable” correlation structure, which assumes that 
the correlations are the same across judges serving on a panel.20  The results on panel 
composition effects obtained from the logit model are robust to allowing for correlation 
among judges serving on the same panels.  While their standard errors are a bit larger 
relative to the estimated coefficients, the variable for male judges indicating the presence 
of a female colleague and the panel ideology measure still have effects that are 
statistically significant at better than the .01 level.  We still find effects for these panel 
composition variables even after allowing for correlation between judges’ decisions.  
                                                 
17A simple way to address the problem of correlation would be to include a dummy variable for each 
three-judge panel that appears in the data.  This is not a satisfactory approach because, in addition to 
introducing N/3-1 additional parameters into the model (where N indicates the number of cases), it would 
prevent us from estimating the effects of case-level variables which theory and past research tell us should 
be included in the specification, because the dummy variables would be perfectly collinear with the case-
level variables. 
18We could also model each circuit as a cluster and have panel-clusters within circuit clusters.  But one-
level clustering by panels should adequately account for circuit-level correlation not picked up by the 
circuit-level effects. 
19We also estimated models treating the data as generated by a complex survey sampling design. That is, 
we treated each appellate case as if it was a primary sampling unit and the three judges who decided the 
case as repeated observations within the unit.  This approach is an alternative way to allow for correlation 
among judges within the unit/cluster.  Not surprisingly, the results were qualitatively the same as those 
reported for the GEE estimation. 
20We also estimated an “unstructured” correlation matrix, but the results were essentially the same as 
reported here. 
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 This is additional evidence that the gender and ideological makeup of the panel matters 
just as much as the gender and ideology of the individual judge. 
According to the GEE results, only one of the case characteristic variables has a 
statistically significant effect at the .05 level or better: a judge is more likely to vote to 
reverse a decision in favor of a plaintiff than one for a defendant.  Four of the circuit 
effect variables—for the 4th, 5th, 7th, and 10th Circuits—are significant.  Even when we 
account for correlation between judges on a given panel and thereby also partially 
account for correlation between judges on a given circuit, we find circuit-level effects.  
The GEE results suggest that the correlation (conditional on the explanatory variables) 
among judges serving on the same panels and on the same circuit is quite high, estimating 
the correlation parameter  as .891.21  
 
5.  Conclusion 
 
The key finding of this paper is that studies of the influence of minority representation on 
the Court of Appeals must take panel composition into account.  Because past studies 
have paid insufficient attention to institutional structure, they have deployed a 
problematic research design that fails to properly evaluate the influence of minority 
judges on federal appellate decision-making.  Had we followed past Court of Appeals 
studies and evaluated only individual judge characteristics, we would have dramatically 
underestimated the effect that increased representation of women on the federal appellate 
bench has had on the outcome of discrimination claims.  The use of panel composition 
                                                 
21Since GEE does not produce standard errors for , we should be cautious about drawing inferences based 
on this parameter.  See Zorn 2001 for details about an alternative specification for GEEs that will produce 
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 variables revealed a highly robust finding that the presence of a woman on a panel makes 
males on the panel substantially more likely to rule for a discrimination plaintiff, and 
concomitantly increases the probability of a panel decision in favor of a plaintiff. Had we 
included only individual-level judge characteristics, we would have underestimated the 
real influence of gender by about half. Moreover, had we neglected to include variables 
to account for circuit-level effects, our results would have suffered from bias due to 
misspecification.  Since past Court of Appeals studies of minority representation have 
been marked by both of these methodological problems, we believe that our approach 
produces more reliable estimates of the influence of minority representation on Court of 
Appeals decision-making.  Our analysis indicates that the results of past studies, 
particularly those finding an absence of any distinctive influence of women and racial 
minority judges on federal appellate policy-making, are in need of reevaluation taking 
into account panel and circuit-level effects. 
This paper also contributes to work in the literature that finds that the structure of 
judicial institutions shapes the content of the policy they produce.  We posited two sets of 
hypotheses regarding how the institution of three judge panels, where a strong norm of 
unanimity prevails, might affect judges’ decisions.  We find evidence for the modified 
content hypotheses in the context of both gender and ideology.  The implication here is 
important to the relationship between descriptive and substantive representation.  The fact 
that one woman on a panel makes it more liberal on anti-discrimination issues 
demonstrates that the majoritarian character of the panel, because it is mitigated by a 
strong norm of unanimity, does not obstruct the conversion of women’s descriptive 
                                                                                                                                                 
standard errors for  (so-called “GEE2”) but is less useful for making inferences about explanatory 
variables. 
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 representation into some degree of substantive representation.  While the marginal effect 
is nontrivial, we again emphasize that measuring change in terms of the probability of a 
decision for the plaintiff is the most extreme form of influencing a decision.  We believe 
that beneath the marginal effects on the probability of entirely flipping a decision from 
defendant to plaintiff are larger influences on the many dimensions of policy formation 
that occur within a decision for a given party.  In this regard it must be said that our 
finding that panels with two women were not more likely to decide cases in favor of the 
plaintiff than panels with one women does not necessarily demonstrate that they did not 
produce decisions more favorable to civil rights plaintiffs. 
We did not find clear evidence either in support of or against the suppressed dissent 
hypotheses in the data.  While the null effects for the race variables would be consistent 
with the suppressed dissent hypotheses if racial minority judges held more liberal views 
on employment discrimination cases, they may in fact not be more liberal. Moreover, past 
research indicates that the measure of case outcomes may be missing subtle but important 
differences between the decisions of racial minority and white judges that have 
significant policy consequences (Sisk, Heise, and Morriss 1998). The participation of 
minority judges on panels might not change case outcomes from defendant to plaintiff, 
while at the same time, for example, influencing the reasoning of decisions in a way that 
produces doctrine that is more favorable to plaintiffs. 
Developing a deeper comprehension of how the majoritarian appellate panel structure 
mediates diversification of the judiciary into policy output requires a more thorough 
understanding of the dynamics among judges serving on panels as well as the dynamics 
between the panels and the larger circuit.  One extension of this paper that would enhance 
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 our understanding would be to explore research designs that could differentiate between 
the competing causal explanations within the modified content and suppressed dissent 
hypotheses.  A second extension would be to attempt to operationalize more fine-grained 
measures of influence than case outcome.  Finally, application of our approach to other 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
______________________________________________________________________________________
_ 
Variable        Mean  Std. Dev. Min. Max.  
______________________________________________________________________________________
_ 
Outcome        0.347    0.476     0   1  
Gender        0.146    0.353     0   1  
One female colleague on panel (female judge)    0.030    0.170     0   1  
One female colleague on panel (male judge)    0.247    0.431     0   1  
Two female colleagues on panel (male judge)    0.015    0.122     0   1  
Race         0.085    0.279     0   1  
One nonwhite colleague on panel (nonwhite judge)    0.020    0.140     0   1  
One nonwhite colleague on panel (white judge)    0.140    0.347     0   1  
Two nonwhite colleagues on panel (white judge)    0.010    0.099     0   1  
NOMINATE score       0.138    0.493     -0.535   0.568  
Panel colleagues NOMINATE scores (mean)    0.138    0.280     -0.510   0.568  
Race discrimination       0.222    0.416     0   1  
Gender discrimination       0.328    0.469     0   1  
Harassment        0.185    0.388     0   1  
Age discrimination       0.240    0.427     0   1  
Religious discrimination       0.015    0.122     0   1  
Nationality discrimination      0.030    0.171     0   1  
Reverse gender discrimination      0.043    0.202     0   1  
Reverse race discrimination      0.026    0.158     0   1  
Disability discrimination      0.297    0.457     0   1  
Government defendant       0.333    0.471     0   1  
EEOC plaintiff        0.015    0.122     0   1  
Defendant appeal       0.155    0.362     0   1  
Plaintiff appeal        0.752    0.432     0   1  
Both appeal        0.092    0.290     0   1  
Posture         0.718    0.450     0   1  
1st Circuit dummy       0.060    0.238     0   1  
2nd Circuit dummy       0.062    0.242     0   1  
3rd Circuit dummy       0.033    0.177     0   1  
4th Circuit dummy       0.028    0.164     0   1  
5th Circuit dummy       0.098    0.297     0   1  
6th Circuit dummy       0.055    0.228     0   1  
7th Circuit dummy       0.203    0.402     0   1  
8th Circuit dummy       0.190    0.392     0   1  
9th Circuit dummy       0.062    0.242     0   1  
10th Circuit dummy       0.077    0.267     0   1  
11th Circuit dummy       0.102    0.303     0   1  
D.C. Circuit dummy       0.030    0.171     0   1  
______________________________________________________________________________________
_  
Note: N=1200.  
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Table 2:  Logit Analysis of Judges' Votes in Appeals Court Decisions 
______________________________________________________________________________________
_ 
       Model 1     Model 2  




Intercept       1.373    0.336     1.102    0.356  
Gender       0.420    0.200     0.832    0.233  
One female colleague (female judge)    ___    ___  -0.411    0.454  
One female colleague (male judge)  ___     ___  0.811    0.182  
Two female colleagues (male judge)    ___  ___  -0.370  0.574  
Race        -0.017    0.270     -0.257    0.313  
One nonwhite colleague (nonwhite judge) ___  ___  0.254    0.578  
One nonwhite colleague (white judge) ___  ___  -0.212    0.240  
Two nonwhite colleagues (white judge)    ___  ___  -0.239    0.750  
NOMINATE score      -0.451    0.154     -0.608    0.162  
Panel colleagues' NOMINATE scores    ___  ___  -1.064    0.245  
Race discrimination      0.342    0.201     0.392    0.208  
Gender discrimination      -0.067    0.181     -0.131    0.186  
Harassment       0.760    0.199     0.714    0.209  
Age discrimination      0.081    0.187     0.020    0.193  
Religious discrimination      -0.730    0.600     -0.737    0.629  
Nationality discrimination     -0.395    0.507     -0.074    0.500  
Reverse gender discrimination     0.374    0.376     0.545    0.391  
Reverse race discrimination     -1.303    0.609     -1.390    0.613  
Government defendant      0.139    0.158     0.126    0.162  
EEOC plaintiff       0.266    0.590     0.127    0.612  
Plaintiff appeal       -1.541    0.231     -1.580    0.237  
Both appeal       0.667    0.282     0.668    0.289  
Posture       0.013    0.202     -0.047    0.208  
1st Circuit dummy      -1.376    0.395     -1.099    0.410  
2nd Circuit dummy      -0.716    0.362     -0.638    0.372  
3rd Circuit dummy      -1.924    0.508     -1.383    0.547  
4th Circuit dummy      -2.088    0.568     -1.952    0.578  
5th Circuit dummy      -2.503    0.384     -2.102    0.403  
6th Circuit dummy      -0.016    0.377     0.172    0.401  
7th Circuit dummy      -1.573    0.305     -1.210    0.321  
8th Circuit dummy      -1.356    0.311     -0.824    0.328  
10th Circuit dummy      -1.596    0.367     -1.413    0.382  
11th Circuit dummy      -0.404    0.325     -0.159    0.334  
D.C. Circuit dummy      -1.253    0.486     -1.183    0.496  
 
Likelihood ratio test      271.33  (p<.0001)     321.24   (p<.0001)  
% correctly predicted      78.5        80.7   
______________________________________________________________________________________
__   
Note:  Table entries are maximum likelihood estimates.  N=1200. 
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Variable        Coefficient   Std.  Err.  
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
Intercept        1.099    0.622  
One woman on panel       0.837    0.283  
Two women on panel       -0.470    0.629  
One nonwhite on panel       -0.216    0.365  
Two nonwhites on panel       0.279    0.798  
Mean of panel NOMINATE scores     -1.750    0.558  
Race discrimination       0.485    0.364  
Gender discrimination       -0.164    0.327  
Harassment        0.799    0.365  
Age discrimination       0.096    0.337  
Religious discrimination       -0.685    1.086  
Nationality discrimination      -0.170    0.872  
Reverse gender discrimination      0.626    0.690  
Reverse race discrimination      -1.795    1.175  
Government defendant       0.129    0.282  
EEOC plaintiff        -0.275    1.091  
Plaintiff appeal        -1.526    0.413  
Both appeal        0.714    0.504  
Posture        -0.056    0.363  
1st Circuit dummy       -1.168    0.715  
2nd Circuit dummy       -0.616    0.648  
3rd Circuit dummy       -1.399    0.946  
4th Circuit dummy       -2.680    1.188  
5th Circuit dummy       -2.262    0.714  
6th Circuit dummy       -0.011    0.698  
7th Circuit dummy       -1.245    0.559  
8th Circuit dummy       -0.916    0.573  
10th Circuit dummy       -1.477    0.665  
11th Circuit dummy       -0.236    0.583  
D.C. Circuit dummy       -1.114    0.855  
    
Likelihood ratio test       112.49        (p<.0001)  
% correctly predicted       81.3   
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 Note:  Table entries are maximum likelihood estimates.  N=400. 
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Table 4:  GEE Analysis of Judges’ Votes in Appeals Court Decisions 
______________________________________________________________________________________
__ 
Variable        Coefficient   Std.  Err.  
______________________________________________________________________________________
__ 
Intercept        1.146    0.621  
Gender        0.834    0.282  
One female colleague (female judge)     -0.407    0.593  
One female colleague (male judge)     0.812    0.280  
Two female colleagues (male judge)     -0.369    0.592  
Race         -0.270    0.374  
One nonwhite colleague (nonwhite judge)     -0.243    0.792  
One nonwhite colleague (white judge)     -0.227    0.368  
Two nonwhite colleagues (white judge)     -0.681    1.145  
NOMINATE score       -0.604    0.178  
Panel colleagues' NOMINATE scores     -1.062    0.349  
Race discrimination       0.372    0.326  
Gender discrimination       -0.098    0.311  
Harassment        0.653    0.361  
Age discrimination       0.017    0.340  
Religious discrimination       -0.709    1.143  
Nationality discrimination      -0.093    0.884  
Reverse gender discrimination      0.453    0.727  
Reverse race discrimination      -1.517    1.027  
Government defendant       0.086    0.270  
EEOC plaintiff        -0.085    1.416  
Plaintiff appeal        -1.538    0.393  
Both appeal        0.681    0.503  
Posture        -0.073    0.318  
1st Circuit dummy       -1.134    0.652  
2nd Circuit dummy       -0.627    0.654  
3rd Circuit dummy       -1.422    0.780  
4th Circuit dummy       -2.045    0.857  
5th Circuit dummy       -2.058    0.699  
6th Circuit dummy       0.019    0.719  
7th Circuit dummy       -1.246    0.549  
8th Circuit dummy       -0.868    0.572  
10th Circuit dummy       -1.440    0.677  
11th Circuit dummy       -0.185    0.591  
D.C. Circuit dummy       -1.180    0.804  
    
  p       0.891    ___ 
 
______________________________________________________________________________________
_   
 Note:  Table entries are logit estimates.  N=1200. 
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